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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 990195-CA 
v. : 
JEREMIAH MAUL, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995), aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1999), and theft of a firearm, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1999). This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Should this Court reach defendant's peremptory challenge claim where 
defendant failed to preserve it below? 
Because this issue does not require this Court to review any district court ruling, 
no standard of review applies. 
II. Should this Court reach defendant's juror challenge where defendant has 
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding which he 
now challenges? 
Because this issue does not require this Court to review any district court ruling, 
no standard of review applies. 
III. Did the trial court properly refuse defendant's motion for new trial 
where defendant failed to establish that, had Juror Christensen 
disclosed her acquaintanceship with certain witnesses during voir dire, 
she would have been removable for cause for bias? 
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial 
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah App.) 
(stating decision will not be reversed unless decision "appears to be so unreasonable that 
upon review it appears that [the court] was plainly wrong, in that there is a strong 
likelihood that the plaintiff could not have had a fair trial'9 (brackets in original) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (Utah App. 1989). Where the trial court holds an 
evidentiary hearing on a motion based on juror nondisclosure on voir dire, the court's 
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Thomas {Thomas II), 830 P.2d 
243,245 (Utah 1992). The trial court's determination whether those facts would have 
supported removal for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion,1 as is its determination 
1
 Although Thomas II applies a correctness standard, it does so because the 
trial court reached only the juror nondisclosure question and, finding it dispositive, did 
2 
that a juror is not otherwise biased. See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981) (recognizing trial court's "advantaged position in determining which persons would 
be fair and impartial jurors" and holding that its determination "should not be disturbed 
unless [it] abuses [its] discretion"); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 
1980), overruled on other grounds byRandle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah App. 1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rules 18, 23, and 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are set forth in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 9, 1998, defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995); aggravated kidnapping, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1999); and theft 
of a firearm, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1999) [R. 1-2]. Defendant was bound over on all counts [R. 15]. Before trial, defendant 
not reach the question of removal for cause; thus the Utah Supreme Court treated the 
removal question as a question of law. See Thomas II, 830 P.2d at 245. 
3 
filed a Notice of Alibi [R. 40]. At trial, two witnesses, Angela Goode and Mary Goode, 
testified in support of defendant's alibi [R. 168-79]. 
At trial, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts [R. 125, 159-61]. Defendant 
then filed a timely motion for new trial alleging juror misconduct [R. 176]. The trial 
court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and subsequently issued Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order denying the motion [R. 187, 196, 201; 
Addendum B]. Defendant was then sentenced and the final judgment and order was 
issued on January 6, 1999 [R. 206]. Defendant timely appealed [R. 213, 233, 238]. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
The Crimes 
On January 6, 1998, Ginger Mellor was house-sitting for her sister and brother-in-
law, Brenda and Craig Nielson, at their home in Centerfield, Utah [R. 245:943 ]. Brenda 
and Craig lived there with Craig's 23-year-old son, Clay, and Brenda's 14-year old son, 
Kent [R. 245:95; 246:27, 44, 48]. That day, Brenda, Craig, and Clay had gone to New 
Mexico on a trucking trip [R. 245:96]. Ginger was watching Kent; Ginger's 13-year-old 
daughter was also there [R. 245:96]. That night, the children went to sleep in a 
2
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and the 
trial court's findings of fact. See State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 878 (Utah App. 1992). 
3
 Because the pages of transcripts are not individually numbered, the record 
citation used is to the record cite, which identifies the particular transcript, followed by 
the actual page number of the transcript. 
4 
downstairs bedroom; Ginger went to sleep in Brenda and Craig's room upstairs [R. 
245:97-98]. 
Ginger fell asleep around 1:00 a.m. [R. 245:98]. She was awakened when 
Brenda's dog started barking [R. 245:99]. She sat straight up in the bed and instantly had 
a flashlight in her face [R. 245:99]. Except for seeing Brenda's alarm clock out of the 
corner of her eye, Ginger could see nothing but the flashlight [R. 245:99]. The clock 
read 2:01 a.m. [R. 245:104, 141]. 
Defendant, who was holding the flashlight, told Ginger not to move [R. 245:101 ]. 
He then asked her who lived in the home; when she told him Craig and Brenda Nielson, 
he asked "Where is Clay?" [R. 245:101]. After asking who she was and asking again 
about Clay, defendant asked if anyone else was present [R. 245:104]. Ginger told him 
about the children [R. 245:104]. Ginger then saw for the first time Ginger that defendant 
was not alone; defendant leaned backwards to tell a second man about the children [R. 
245:106]. 
Defendant then said he'd heard there was a lot of money in the house and asked 
Ginger if she knew anything about it [R. 245:107]. Ginger said "no" and that the only 
money she knew of was the money in her wallet [R. 245:108]. Defendant then told 
Ginger that if she didn't cooperate, "he would basically blow my F-in' head off [R. 
245:108]. Ginger later confirmed that defendant had a gun [R. 245:117-19]. 
5 
Defendant then ordered Ginger downstairs and threatened her a second time [R. 
245:109]. Defendant asked where the children were and shined a light in their bedroom 
to make sure they were still asleep [R. 245:111]. He then asked what the next room was 
and when told it was Clay's room, he said, "This is where Clay stays and this is where 
Clay sleeps?" [R. 245:112]. Defendant then told Ginger to cross Clay's bed on her knees 
and shut off the nightlight on the other side [R. 245:112]. After she did so, defendant told 
her to remain on the bed and lay on her stomach [R. 245:112-13]. Defendant then tied 
Ginger up tightly with an extension cord; he tied her wrists and then her ankles, and then 
tied her wrists to her ankles [R. 245:115-17]. 
Defendant and his companion then started ransacking Clay's room, "opening 
drawers, lookin' in the closet and whatnot" [R. 245:117]. After again threatening Ginger 
and showing her his gun, defendant and his companion went upstairs, supposedly to 
continue looking for the money [R. 245:117-19]. When they returned, defendant told 
Ginger not to call the police "because they would be watching the house and if they seen 
signs of Cop cars or red lights or anything, that they would be back, maybe not that night, 
maybe not the next night, but they would be back to get their revenge" [R. 245:120]. He 
told Ginger not to try to untie herself until she could no longer hear their vehicle [R. 
245:120]. 
After Ginger heard the vehicle leave, she called for her daughter to untie her [R. 
245:120-21]. Ginger noticed that one of the phones had been ripped out of the wall; she 
6 
used a Mickey Mouse phone to call Brenda [R. 245:122, 221; 246:49]. Brenda told her to 
get Craig's handgun out of their bedroom, leave the house, and go to their parents9 home 
in Sterling [R. 245:123]. However, both the gun and its holster were missing [R. 
245:124]. 
Ginger returned to the front room about six minutes after the intruders left; the 
clock read 2:52 a.m. [R. 245:125, 130, 142]. Ginger then took the children to her parents' 
home in Sterling [R. 245:126]. Deputy Sheriffs Anderson and Edwards arrived soon 
thereafter [R. 245:172]. 
While there, Deputy Edwards used his cell phone to contact Clay Nielson [R. 
245:173-74]. When Deputy Edwards told Clay about the break-in, Clay responded: "It's 
that Goddamned Jeremy" [R. 245:174]. Clay explained that Jeremy lived in American 
Fork with a woman named Angie [Angela Goode], that Clay and Angela had had a child 
together, and that Clay and Angela were in an ongoing custody battle over the child [R. 
245:175]. Clay didn't know Jeremy's last name, but told Deputy Edwards to call 
Angela's mother, Mary, for more information [R. 245:175-76]. Deputy Edwards called 
Mary about 4:00 a.m. [R. 245:176-77, 179]. When asked where Angela and Jeremy were, 
Mary gave Deputy Edwards their American Fork address and Jeremy's last name before 
abruptly ending the conversation [R. 245:177-79]. Jeremy was soon detained and taken 
to the American Fork police station [R. 245:180-82]. 
7 
At about 8:00 a.m, Deputy Edwards called Ginger and asked her to come to the 
Sanpete County Sheriffs Office [R. 245:127, 182]. Deputy Edwards informed her that 
they had a suspect in custody and wanted to do a voice identification [R. 245:128,183]. 
After the suspect had talked for about one minute, Ginger identified him as the intruder 
who had threatened her [R. 245:131,186-88]. 
At about 6:00 p.m., Deputy Edwards met with defendant and Deputy Gary Larsen 
at the police station in American Fork [R. 245:189; 246:8]. After Deputy Edwards gave 
defendant his Miranda warnings, defendant agreed to talk and admitted ;i[i]t was me that 
did it" [R. 245:189-93; 246:11-12]. Defendant confessed that he had entered the house 
with a gun and that he was "after Clay" and had come "to kill him" [R. 245:191-95; 
246:11-13]. Defendant also admitted that he had stolen both Craig's gun and the money 
from Ginger's wallet [R. 245:194-95; 246:12, 13]. When asked what he had used to tie 
Ginger up, defendant said it was electrical cord that he had gotten from inside the home 
[R. 246:14]. Defendant told Deputy Edwards that he had thrown the two guns out the 
window after leaving the Nielson residence [R. 245:186, 197-98; 246:24]. 
Jury voir dire 
During jury voir dire, the trial court asked each venireperson for a personal 
description. Juror Christensen, the juror to whom defendant's appeal relates, stated: 
"Christine Christensen. I live in Fountain Green. My husband's name is Allan 
Christensen, We have three kids. Um, I work at 7-Eleven in Nephi and he works at 
« 
Automax in Spanish Fork" [R. 245:17]. Juror Matthews, who was peremptorily struck by 
defendant, indicated that he worked at a correctional facility as a teacher and was an LDS 
Stake president in Gunnison [R. 245:14-15]. Juror Madsen, also peremptorily struck by 
defendant, indicated that his only son was a retired police officer in Oregon [R. 245:15]. 
Juror Johnson, also peremptorily struck by defendant, stated that she was married and 
lived in Ephraim; her husband worked for Skyline Mines and she worked for her father's 
construction company [R. 245:17]. She had four children, including a two year old [R. 
245:18]. 
Later in voir dire, the trial court asked the attorneys to introduce themselves, their 
parties, and their witnesses [R. 245:20-23]. The court then asked the venirepersons 
whether any of them were related to any of those people or shared a business relationship, 
or a guardian/ward, employer/employee, attorney/client, creditor/debtor, or 
landlord/tenant relationship with them [R. 245:23-26]. The court then stated: 
All right. I'm going to ask now about more general relationships. 
Before I do, I need to draw a distinction between acquaintanceships and 
close relationships. 
We live in a small area. It's not uncommon that you would know 
everyone in the town where you live and maybe everyone in the end of the 
county where you live and maybe many people throughout the county. I'm 
not concerned about general acquaintanceships, because those are just so 
common that we all live with those every day and adjust to them. I am 
concerned about close relationships that could compromise your ability to 
be fair. I'll give you an example. 
In my neighborhood, ah, I'm acquainted with everyone, but there are 
certain ones that I have much closer relationship. My neighbor across the 
street, we play golf together and we go fishing when we can find time. And 
if he were involved, I would feel a level of discomfort in—in deciding 
9 
important issues because we have a relationship as close [sic]. That's what 
I'm concerned about is whether there's any one of you who has a close 
relationship, a sufficiently close relationship with the defendant, the 
lawyers, the alleged victim I'm concerned about a sufficiently close 
relationship that it would compromise your ability to be fair and objective. 
[R. 245:26-27]. Juror Collard indicated that she had bowled with Brenda "for a year, but 
I don't know her very well," that it was about two years ago that they had bowled 
together, that it was weekly contact, and that there were a lot of other people there at the 
same time [R. 245:27-28]. When asked whether "there [is] anything about that 
relationship that would cause you to be prejudiced for or against a position that she might 
advance or testimony she might give," Juror Collard said "no" [R. 245:28]. The defense 
attorney stated that he was "just a teeny uncomfortable" with Juror Collard," that 
"probably there isn't any problem," and that "[i]f it were a little closer in time, I think I'd 
have grounds for objection" [R. 245:50-51]. 
Juror Ludvigson indicated that, as mayor of Sterling, he had employed Deputy 
Sheriffs Edwards and Larsen on off-hours but that he could decide the case fairly [R. 
245:28-29]. Juror Ludvigson indicated that it had been some three or four years since 
Deputy Edwards had worked for his town and that Larsen hadn't worked "for us quite 
some time and he just kind of started up again" [R. 245:49]. 
Juror Larsen indicated that he knew the prosecuting attorney from high school, but 
that it was "[n]ot a close relationship" [R. 245:32-3]. 
10 
Although the trial court allowed defense counsel to ask additional questions on 
numerous occasions, defense counsel neither objected to the trial court's description of 
the relationships that should be disclosed nor asked any additional questions on that issue 
[R. 245:39-44,46-47,48-50]. Defendant made no challenges for cause.4 Defendant used 
his peremptory challenges on Jurors Collard, Mathews, Madsen, and Johnson [R. 126, R. 
245:60]. 
Hearing on motion for new trial 
Defendant's motion for new trial focused exclusively on Juror Christensen. He 
asserted that she "was not candid, honest and forthcoming in her answers to voir dire 
questions" [R. 176]. Specifically, defendant claimed that Juror Christensen had failed to 
disclose her positive relationships with two State witnesses and her negative relationships 
with two defense witnesses [R. 177-78]. Affidavits of two defense witnesses, Angela 
Goode and Mary Goode, supported defendant's motion [R. 168-79]. Angela Goode was 
4
 Neither defendant nor the State requested that any venireperson be removed 
for cause. The trial court did, however, excuse five venirepeople on its own motion: Ila 
M. Edwards, who is witness Blake Edwards' mother [R. 245:24]; DeeAnn T. Pratt, who 
indicated she would probably by biased due to the fact that her husband's office had been 
burglarized [R. 245:31-32]; D. Kent Despain, who indicated he would not be able to be 
impartial based on information he had already received concerning the crime [R. 245:47]; 
Don Blain Taylor, who, along with his wife, works for the State of Utah Correctional 
Facility and indicated that "[i]f I were a defendant, though, I wouldn't want me on the 
jury" [R. 245:53-55]; and Lorraine N. Bailey, who indicated she was very good friends 
with "Fred [Craig?] Nielson" [R. 245:55-56]. 
11 
defendant's girlfriend at the time of trial and testified as an alibi witness; Mary Goode is 
Angela Goode's mother and also testified in favor of defendant at trial [R. 168-79]. 
Mary Goode's affidavit alleged that Juror Christensen was acquainted with one of 
the State's witnesses, Clay Nielson [R. 171]. It alleged that Clay often visited his brother, 
who lived across from the Christensens, and that Clay was a long-time friend of Juror 
Christensen's husband [R. 171]. Mary Goode's affidavit also alleged that Juror 
Christensen had worked under Mary Goode's supervision as a maid for Super 8 Motel in 
1996 or 1997 and that Mary Goode was instrumental in having Juror Christensen fired 
from that position [R. 169-70]. 
Angela Goode's affidavit alleged that Juror Christensen knew Angela Goode and 
had helped spread false accusations concerning Angela Goode's relationship with Juror 
Christensen's husband [R. 168-79]. 
In his motion for new trial, defendant argued that had Juror Christensen revealed 
this information during jury voir dire, she "would have been subject to challenge and 
based upon any of this information would have entitled the Defendant to inquire further 
as to the circumstances surrounding that termination, acquaintances and to the bias, 
adversity or prejudice created by those acquaintances[,] termination of employment, 
adverse accusations and relationships" [R. 178]. Juror Christensen's failure to do so, 
claimed defendant, denied him his right to a jury "free from bias, prejudice or 
impartiality" [R. 178]. 
12 
At the motion hearing, defendant called only two witnesses, Juror Christensen 
and Angela Goode. Juror Christensen testified that she did not know the full name of 
the person named Nielson who lived across the street from her; that neither Craig 
Nielson nor Clay Nielson had been to her house while she lived there; that she had 
never heard her husband speak of any of the Nielson brothers; and that she "never 
knew Craig Nielson" and "Clay Nielson I had seen, but I didn't know who he was" [R. 
244:8-9, 14]. 
Juror Christensen also testified that she had worked with Mary Goode for two 
months in 1993 at Super-8; that the two are not well-acquainted; that her only 
association with Mary Goode was that they "passed in the halls"; that Mary Goode was 
not Juror Christensen's supervisor; that the two may have used the same cart but did 
not talk about their lives, activities, etc.; that they never car-pooled; and that they may 
have passed each other on the Fountain Green streets [R. 244:9-12]. Finally, Juror 
Christensen testified that she had met Angela Goode about five years before the trial; 
that she had attended a cook-out with her husband and friends at which Angela Goode 
was present; and that she had not heard of any allegations that her husband and Angela 
Goode had any kind of social relationship [R. 244:13-14]. 
Angela Goode testified that Juror Christensen was "4[p]robably not' anything 
more than a casual acquaintance"; that she did not know whether her mother had ever 
socialized with Juror Christensen; that although she occasionally ran into Juror 
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Christensen at 7-Eleven, she never went there to visit Juror Christensen — rather, Juror 
Christensen "just happened to be workin'"; that she did not know whether the 
Christensens were friends with Clay Nielson's family or whether they ever socialized 
together; and that Angela Goode had never heard Juror Christensen discuss any 
accusations concerning Angela Goode and Juror Christensen's husband [R. 244:23-24, 
29]. 
The trial court found that, because Angela Goode had an ongoing relationship 
with defendant and because both she and her mother had displayed a highly favorable 
attitude toward defendant at the trial, their testimony was less credible than was Juror 
Christensen's [R. 244:36-37; R. 199]. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that "[n]o actual or implied bias 
against the defendant by [Juror] Christensen has been shown" and that ;w[n]° basis would 
have existed for any challenge for cause against [Juror] Christensen" [R. 199-200]. The 
trial court thus denied defendant's motion [R. 200]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that he "was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror 
Christine Christensen's failure to advise the trial court of her relationship with several key 
witnesses during jury selection and voir dire." Aplt. Br. at 15. 
To the extent defendant claims error in the trial court's conduct of voir dire, 
defendant failed to preserve this claim below and has therefore waived it. To the extent 
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defendant challenges a trial court finding on the motion for new trial, defendant has failed 
to sufficiently marshal the evidence in support of that finding and, thus, has waived his 
claim on this ground also. Finally, defendant's claim fails on the merits because 
defendant could not demonstrate that disclosure by Juror Christensen would have 
subjected her to removal for cause or that Juror Christensen was otherwise biased toward 
defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO PRESERVE IT BELOW 
On appeal, defendant claims that Juror Christensen's "failure to disclose even the 
casual nature of her relationship [sic] with the Nielson's [sic] and more particularly with 
Mary and Angela Goode" during voir dire denied him "his right to a fair and impartial 
jury." Aplt. Br. at 15, 16 (emphasis added). Defendant further asserts that Juror 
Christensen's "failure to disclose any relationship between her and the defense witnesses 
prevented the trial court and counsel from engaging in further investigation of any actual 
bias on the part of [Juror] Christensen as it related to her feelings toward Mary and 
Angela Goode" and "prevented [defendant] from collecting the data which would have 
permitted the informed exercise of a peremptory challenge to dismiss [Juror] Christensen 
from the jury panel." Aplt. Br. at 17 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, defendant apparently finds error in the trial court's explanation to the 
venirepeople that the only relationships they had to disclose were those which could 
interfere with their ability to be fair and impartial and that they did not have to disclose 
relationships that were of a purely casual nature [R. 245:23-26]. However, defendant 
never objected to this explanation. Furthermore, the trial court gave defendant numerous 
opportunities to ask the venirepeople additional questions on voir dire. Although availing 
himself more than once of those opportunities, defendant never asked any further 
questions on the relationship issue [R. 245:39-44, 46-47, 48-50].5 Any attack on the 
scope of voir dire is therefore waived. 
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim 
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, "[i]t is not the 
paternalistic duty of the court to interject itself into the voir dire process by fashioning 
additional voir dire questions that neither party has requested." Davis v. Grand Cty Serv. 
Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah App. 1995). Thus, "failure to voir dire the jurors on [an] 
issue or object to the trial court's failure to cover the issue constitutes a waiver and bars 
5
 Unlike State v. Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah June 11, 1999), then, 
this is not a case where the trial court has unduly restricted defendant's voir dire. See 
Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (finding error in trial court where "prospective 
juror's answers provide evidence of possible bias and the trial court does not allow further 
questions designed to probe the extent and the depth of the bias" (emphasis added)). 
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inquiry into the bias question." State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); see also 
State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (holding failure to object to 
trial court's voir dire or to ask permission to personally voir dire jury effectively waived 
issue of jury bias). 
Because defendant neither objected to the trial court's conduct of jury voir dire nor 
availed himself of the opportunity to ask the venirepeople any additional questions 
concerning their knowledge of trial witnesses, defendant has waived any claim of juror 
bias based on the relationship issue and this Court should not consider it. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
WHICH HE NOW CHALLENGES 
The remainder of defendant's argument appears to rest on his assertion that "the 
relationship between [J]uror Christensen and Mary and Angela Goode goes beyond the 
casual nature found by the trial court after trial." Aplt. Br. at 17; see also Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding 15 [R. 199]. Defendant thus attacks a factual 
finding of the trial court. 
A trial court's factual findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 
1987). To challenge a trial court's factual findings on appeal, the "appellant must 
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marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
475-76 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Defendant has neither marshaled all of the evidence 
in support of the trial court's finding, nor demonstrated that such evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding. Instead, defendant appears to be merely rearguing 
his case to this Court. However, an appellate court "[does] not weigh conflicting 
evidence, nor [does it] substitute [its] judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that 
of the [fact finder]." State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1995); State v. 
Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 132 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879 
(Utah App. 1992). Thus, this Court should not consider defendant's claim. 
In any case, the evidence as properly marshaled clearly supports the trial court's 
finding that Juror Christensen's relationships with Mary Goode and Angela Goode were 
both "casual" and "minimal": Juror Christensen worked with Mary Goode for only two 
months in 1993—five years prior to defendant's trial [R. 244:9-11]. They are not well-
acquainted [R. 244:9]. Mary Goode was not Juror Christensen's supervisor [R. 
244:10]. Juror Christensen's only association with Mary Goode was that they "passed 
in the halls" and may have used the same cart [R. 244:10-11]. They did not talk about 
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their lives, activities, etc. [R. 244:11]. They never car-pooled [R. 244:12]. They may 
have passed each other on the Fountain Green streets [R. 244:12]. Juror Christensen 
met Angela Goode about five years before the trial [R. 244:13]. Angela Goode 
attended a cook-out at which Juror Christensen was present with her husband and his 
friends [R. 244:13]. Juror Christensen had not heard of any allegations that her 
husband and Angela Goode had any kind of social relationship [R. 244:13-14]. Even 
defense witness Angela Goode considered Juror Christensen as "6[p]robably not' 
anything more than a casual acquaintance"; she was not aware of any social interactions 
between her mother and Juror Christensen [R. 244:22-23, 29]. Although Angela 
Goode occasionally ran into Juror Christensen at 7-Eleven, Angela Goode never went 
there to visit Juror Christensen; rather, Juror Christensen "just happened to be 
workin'" [R. 244:23], Angela Goode had never heard Juror Christensen discuss any 
accusations concerning Angela Goode and Juror Christensen's husband [R. 244:24]. 
Thus, the finding is not "clearly erroneous." The evidence clearly supports the 
trial court's finding that "[Juror] Christensen's relationship and knowledge relating to 
Mary Goode [and] Angela Goode . . . are all of a casual nature" and that u[h]er contact 
with all of these people was minimal." See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Finding 15 [R. 199]. Thus, to the extent defendant's argument requires an opposite 
finding, his claim on appeal necessarily fails. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THAT, HAD JUROR CHRISTENSEN DISCLOSED 
HER ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITH CERTAIN WITNESSES 
DURING VOIR DIRE, SHE WOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVABLE 
FOR CAUSE FOR BIAS 
Defendant argues that he "was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror 
Christine Christensen's failure to advise the trial court of her relationship with several key 
witnesses during jury selection and voir dire." Aplt. Br. at 15. He claims that "[Juror] 
Christensen's failure to disclose any relationship between her [sic] and the defense 
witnesses prevented the trial court and counsel from engaging in further investigation of 
any actual bias on the part of Christensen as it related to her feelings toward Mary and 
Angela Goode" that might have supported a challenge for cause. Aplt. Br. at 16-17.6 To 
obtain a new trial based on juror nondisclosure, defendant had to demonstrate (1) that 
Juror Christensen failed to disclose information on a material question during voir dire, 
and (2) that disclosure would have given defendant grounds to challenge Juror 
Christensen for cause. See State v. Thomas, (Thomas I), 111 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989) 
(citing McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 
6
 Defendant's appeal relies solely on Juror Christensen's knowledge of some 
witnesses as the source of her alleged bias; he has made no allegations that Juror 
Christensen was otherwise biased and thus any reference by defendant to "actual bias" is 
to that bias allegedly reflected in Juror Christensen's nondisclosure. See Aplt. Br. at 16; 
State v. Thomas, (Thomas I), 111 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989). 
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850 (1984)); State v. Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).7 Defendant has 
failed to carry that burden. 
The trial court found that "[Juror] Christensen did not advise the Court about any 
acquaintance she had with any of the above four named witnesses [i.e., Mary Goode, 
Angela Goode, Clay Nielson and Craig Nielson]." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Finding 4 [R. 197]. The trial court also found, however, that during voir dire it had 
only instructed the jurors to disclose "any relationship or acquaintance they had with the 
witnesses that was something other than the casual acquaintance acquired by people 
living in small towns," id, Finding 5 (emphasis added) [R. 197]; that Juror Christensen*s 
"relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela Goode, Clay Nielson and 
Craig Niesen are all of a casual nature"; and that "[h]er contact with all of these people 
was minimal," id., Finding 15 [R. 199]. Thus, the question asked on voir dire was 
whether any venireperson had something other than a casual relationship with any of the 
7
 Although defendant claims that Juror Christensen's nondisclosure interfered 
with his ability to exercise a peremptory challenge against her, such an argument is 
irrelevant under McDonough: "'[I]t ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the 
slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an 
item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir dire 
examination.'" Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1483 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting 
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S. Ct. at 849); see also Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 
P.2d 391, 395 (Utah App. 1995); Cannon v. A.L. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 
1988). Again, this is not a case where the trial court improperly limited the defendant's 
opportunity to ask questions during voir dire. Cf. State v. Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6, 13 (Utah June 11, 1999). 
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witnesses. Because Juror Christensen did not have anything more than a casual 
relationship with any of them, she was not required to respond to the question. There was 
no lack of disclosure on Juror Christensen's part; under the question as asked, she simply 
had nothing to disclose.8 Thus, defendant has failed to establish, as he must under the 
first prong of McDonough, that Juror Christensen failed to answer a voir dire question 
honestly. See Thomas I, 777 P.2d at 451. 
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that disclosure of Juror Christensen's 
minimal contact with some of the witnesses would have exposed her to a successful 
challenge for cause. Rule 18(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
a juror may be challenged for cause where there exists "any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness . . . , 
which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
8
 Even if the question had required the venirepeople to disclose any 
acquaintanceships with the witnesses, defendant has failed to establish that such a 
question was "material" under McDonough. Under McDonough, a voir dire question is 
not material if its only relevance is to provide defendant with information with which to 
exercise a peremptory challenge against a juror. "'It ill serves the important end of 
finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process 
because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained 
from a juror on voir dire examination/" Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1483 (10th Cir. 
1987) (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S. Ct. at 849). To be material, the 
question must be "germane to [the juror's] capacity to sit as an impartial juror." State v. 
Pierce, 788 P.2d 352, 356 (N.M. 1990). The question of whether Juror Christensen had a 
casual acquaintanceship with any witness where that acquaintanceship would not affect 
her ability to be fair and impartial simply is not a question that is "germane to [Juror 
Christensen's] capacity to sit as an impartial juror." Id. 
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prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism." Utah R. Cr. P. 18(e)(4). 
Rule 18(e)(14) provides that a juror may be challenged for cause where a "state of 
mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of 
the party challenging"). See id. 18(e)(14). 
Utah courts read these rules to mean that a juror is removable for cause only if that 
juror has "strong and deep impressions" regarding a party, counsel, or a witness to the 
proceeding or regarding the underlying subject matter of the proceeding. See State v. 
Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983) (stating "[o]nly 'strong and deep impressions' 
on the part of a venireman, however, serve as a basis for disqualification for cause" and 
"question of degree of partiality (or 'impressions') remains largely within the discretion 
of the trial court"); State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 939 (Utah App. 1990). The Utah 
Supreme Court itself has distinguished between "acquaintances, which connotes mere 
familiarity with the identity of the witnesses," and "friendships, viz., a relationship of 
affection, respect, or esteem." State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah 1977) 
(reversing trial court's denial of removal for cause of two jurors who indicated close 
friendships with State witnesses). 
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The trial court found that Juror Christensen had worked with Mary Goode for a 
short two-month period some five years prior to trial, that their contact "was minimal, 
of a short duration and of a nonpersonal nature," that Juror Christensen knew Mary 
Goode "only . . . as a person who lived in the same town . . . and worked at the same 
motel for 2 months," and that Juror Christensen has had no contact with Mary Goode 
since 1993. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings 6, 7 [R. 197-98]. The 
court also found that Juror Christensen knew who Angela Goode was but that they were 
"just casual acquaintances" and that Juror Christensen had no knowledge of any rumors 
that Angela Goode was having an affair with Juror Christensen's husband. See id., 
Findings 11-13 [R. 198-99]. Furthermore, the court found that Juror Christensen "had 
no personal contact with Clay Nielson at all other than knowing who he was" and that, 
although Craig Nielson lived across the street from her at one time, "[s]he had no contact 
with him" and "all she knew about him at the time . . . was that his name was Nielson." 
See id., Findings 8, 10 [R. 198]. 
Finally, the trial court found that, because of Angela Goode's and Mary Goode's 
relationship to defendant, their testimony was less credible than was Juror 
Christensen's. See Transcript of Hearing on Defense Motion for New Trial [R. 244:36-
37]; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding 14 [R. 199]; see also State v. 
Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1108 n.2 (Utah 1977) (noting "self-interest may discount 
24 
credibility"); State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1113 n.3 (Utah App. 1998) (deferring to 
trial court where "'body language' factors . . . may have weighed heavily in the judge's 
decision"); Reed, 839 P.2d at 880 (deferring to trial court which "expressed doubts 
about the believability of [defendant's] girlfriend's testimony" where " trial court had 
the opportunity to view these witnesses and weigh their credibility"). 
These findings clearly show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that "[n]o actual or implied bias against the defendant by Christine 
Christensen has been shown" and that "[n]o basis would have existed for any challenge 
for cause against Mrs. Christensen." [R. 199-200]. F 
The trial court's conclusion is consistent with State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 1123, 1126 
(Utah 1989), where the Utah Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's refusing to 
dismiss a juror for cause where voir dire questioning revealed that the juror's "brief 
acquaintance with the prosecutor was not the type of relationship that would warrant an 
inference of bias, especially in light of a later statement where she expressed no doubts 
about her ability to decide the case impartially regardless of any attenuated acquaintance 
with the prosecutor." Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126; see also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 
177-78 (Utah App. 1992) (rejecting challenge to adequacy of trial court voir dire where 
venireperson's responses "could reasonably be viewed as constituting the product of a 
light impression and not one that would close the mind against the testimony that may be 
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offered in opposition" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Woolley, 
810 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah App.) (stating "remoteness of the incident suggests less 
possibility of current bias"), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); State v. Brown, 111 
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In addition, the trial court's conclusion is consistent with defense counsel's 
conduct during voir dire. Defense counsel acknowledged that a relatively recent 
relationship between Juror Collard and a State witness was insufficient to remove Juror 
Collard for cause. He also chose not to challenge either Juror Ludvigson or Juror Larsen 
for cause despite Juror Ludvigson's ongoing work relationships with Deputy Sheriffs 
Edwards and Larsen and Juror Larsen's familiarity with the prosecuting attorney who had 
been a classmate. See page 10 herein. 
Thus, Juror Christensen did not fail to fully respond to any material question; nor 
would the facts, had she volunteered them, have provided any ground to challenge her for 
cause. Juror Christensen harbored no "strong"or "deep" feelings for one side over the 
other. Thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for new trial and this 
Court should affirm that denial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on j7^ October, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are 
completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, 
beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory chal-
lenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the 
remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the 
jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the 
trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all 
jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure 
from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summon-
ing and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and 
shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall specifically set forth the 
facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing 
may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The 
jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the 
hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is 
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors 
to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. 
A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn 
to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made 
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the 
prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the 
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of per-
forming the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged 
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution 
was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between, the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror 
would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is 
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indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, 
or having complained against or having been accused by him in a criminal 
prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and 
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after 
the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant 
for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of such 
conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror 
from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the 
facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on 
of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on 
the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no 
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed 
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon 
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfac-
torily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate 
juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
CroM References. — Number of jurors, 
Utah Const.. Art. I, Sec. 10; § 78-46-5. 
Selection of jury, i 78-46-1 et seq. 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the tacts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JERAMIAH J. MAUL, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 981600003 
Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff 
The defendant's Motion for a New Trial having come before the Court on November 4,1998. 
The defendant was personally present and was represented by his attorney, Randy Kester. The State 
was represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having heard witnesses 
in this matter, and arguments thereon, and being fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) Christine Christensen served as ajuror in the above entitled case on August 27th and 28th, 
w 
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1998. Defendant found guilty by the jury of 3 felony offenses. 
2) Mary Goode and Angela Goode were witnesses for the defendant at trial. Angela Good 
was the defendant's main alibi witness. Angela Goode was living with the defendant in American 
Fork, Utah on the date the offense was committed. Mary Goode is the mother of Angela Goode. 
3) Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen testified for the State at the trial. Clay Nielsen and 
Angela Goode had a child together prior to the date of the offense but were not married. Clay 
Nielsen is the son of Craig Nielsen. 
4) When the Court was picking jurors in this case the above named four witnesses were 
named and identified by the parties as potential witnesses. Christine Christensen did not advise the 
Court about any acquaintance she had with any of the above four named witnesses. 
5) The Court had instructed all potential jurors to inform the Court about any relationship 
or acquaintance they had with the witnesses that was something other than the casual acquaintance 
acquired by people living in small towns. 
6) For a two month period in 1993 Christine Christensen and Mary Goode worked as 
housekeepers (maids) in the same motel in Nephi, Utah. Christensen's contact with Mary Goode was 
minimal, of a short duration, and of a nonpersonal nature dealing with their duties as housekeepers. 
7) Christine Christensen had no social involvement, contact, or relationship with Mary 
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Goode outside of work at the motel in 1993 and only knew her as a person who lived in the same 
town, Fountain Green, and who worked at the same motel for 2 months in 1993. Since 1993 she 
has had no contact with Mary Goode. 
8) For approximately 8 years Christine Christensen lived at 40 North State Street in Fountain 
Green, Utah. For part of that time Craig Nielsen lived across the State Highway from her. That all 
she knew about him at the time they lived across the highway from each other was that his name was 
Nielsen. She had no contact with him. 
9) After the trial in this matter Christine Christensen moved from 40 North State Street in 
Fountain Green to 477 South 200 West in Fountain Green, Utah. That the home at 40 North State 
Street in Fountain Green was a rental home. After the Christensen's left the home the owner of the 
home re-rented the home to Clay Nielsen. Christine Christensen had nothing to do with the rental 
of the home by the owner to Clay Nielsen. 
10) Christine Christensen had no personal contact with Clay Nielsen at all other than 
knowing who he was. 
11) Angela Goode lived in Fountain Green with her mother Mary Goode for approximately 
10-12 years. During that time Christine Christensen became aware of who she was. During that 
time they had been together at the same social function with several other people but were just casual 
acquaintances. 
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12) Christine Christensen also had contact with Angela Goode at Christine's place of 
employment, the 7-11 store in Nephi. That those contacts were incidental relating to Angela going 
into the store for business purposes. 
13) Allegations made by Angela Goode that a rumor existed in Fountain Green that Angela 
Goode was having an affair with Christine Christensen's husband were un-communicated to and 
unknown by Mrs. Christensen. The Court finds no credibility in these un-communicated innuendoes. 
14) The Court finds that in instances of conflict between the testimony of Christine 
Christensen and Angela Goode, the testimony of Christine Christensen to be more credible. 
15) Christine Christensen's relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela 
Goode, Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen are all of a casual nature. Her contact with all of these people 
was minimal. 
16) Mary Goode and Angela Goode both knew who Christine Christensen was, and that she 
was a potential juror prior to her being picked to serve on the jury. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court having made the above and foregoing Findings of Fact now makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1) No actual or implied bias against the defendant by Christine Christensen has been shown. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - State of Utah vs. Maul - 981600003 - Page 5 
2) No basis would have existed for any challenge for cause against Mrs. Christensen. 
3) The defendant's Motion for a New Trial should be denied. 
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BYTHECOURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the defendant's attorney, Randy Kester 
at 101 East 200 South, Springville, Utah 84663, postage prepaid this _2?* day ofNovember, 1998. 
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435) 835-6381 
Facsimile: (435) 835-6383 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JEREMIAH MAUL, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
> Criminal No. 981600003 
i Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff 
Defendant's motion for a new trial having come before the Court on November 4,1998. The 
defendant was personally present and represented by his attorney, Randy Kester. The State was 
represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having entered it's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law now hereby makes the following Judgement and Order: 
1) The defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Judgement and Order to the defendant's attorney, Randy Kester at 101 East 200 South, Springville, 
Utah 84663, postage prepaid t h i s ^ ^ a y of November, 1998. 
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